AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND OF MARYLAND

 

[Under Construction]

 

VERIFIABLE VOTING

 

The American Council of the Blind of Maryland supports improvements to the election process that promote voter confidence in the integrity of the system.  As a voter verifiable paper audit trail would increase voter confidence, the American Council of the Blind of Maryland supports its adoption provided it is made accessible to voters who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise disabled.

 

Since there is some question as to the veracity of the Diebold AccuVote-TS election system, our organization supports the implementation of the Diebold AccuView printer, which contemporaneously produces an accessible voter verifiable paper audit trail.  However, should the State Board of Elections decertify the Diebold AccuVote-TS and adopt a precinct-tabulated, optically scanned, paper ballot system, a device such as the ES & S AutoMark Voter Assist Terminal would be required in each precinct to facilitate the marking of paper ballots by voters who are blind or visually impaired.  However, since voters with dexterity impairments may not be able to manipulate a paper ballot, our organization favors the Inspire Voting System as a means for making a paper ballot both accessible and verifiable.

 

The Inspire Voting System is a new vote-by-phone voting system that enables blind, visually impaired, and otherwise disabled voters to cast a voter verified paper ballot.  It has been adopted for use in six states that require the use of paper ballots.  Should the state of Maryland decertify the current Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machines and return to a paper ballot, this system may well be the system of choice for providing access to blind voters.  A simulated voting experience is available by calling: 1 (888) 661-6366.  Enter 1 2 3 4 as the poll worker I.D. number and 101 as the ballot access number.  For more information about the Inspire Voting System visit www.ivsllc.com.

 

 

ACBM RESOLUTION 2004-3:

 

ACCESSIBLE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER AUDIT TRAIL

 

WHEREAS, the State Board of Elections has adopted the Diebold AccuVote TS election system for use in Maryland without providing for a voter verifiable paper audit trail, and

 

WHEREAS, TrueVoteMD and other interested parties have brought legal action and introduced legislation to require that the election system include a voter verifiable paper audit trail, and

 

WHEREAS, the State Board of Elections may at some future date adopt a voter verifiable paper audit trail for use in conjunction with the Direct Recording Electronic election system, and

 

WHEREAS, the American Council of the Blind of Maryland supports the adoption of specific election systems and procedures only if they are accessible to voters who are blind or otherwise disabled, 

 

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Council of the Blind of Maryland meeting in convention in Baltimore this day, November 7th, 2004, authorizes the President to take all necessary actions to ensure the accessibility of voting equipment and procedures in Maryland including a voter verifiable paper audit trail, if adopted.

 

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND

 

RESOLUTION 2005-16

 

ACCESSIBLE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER AUDIT TRAIL

 

WHEREAS, numerous states have adopted Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) election systems without providing for a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), and

WHEREAS, Common Cause, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Rock the Vote, VerifiedVoting.org, Voters Unite, VoteTrustUSA, and other organizations have brought legal action and introduced legislation to require that DRE election systems include a VVPAT, and

WHEREAS, a VVPAT would increase voter confidence in the election process, and

WHEREAS, some states have and others may adopt a VVPAT for use in conjunction with their DRE election systems, and

 

WHEREAS, the American Council of the Blind supports the adoption of specific election systems and procedures only if they are accessible to voters who are blind, visually impaired or have other disabilities, 

 

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the American Council of the Blind in convention assembled this 8th day of July 2005 at the Riviera Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, that this organization authorize the Officers, Directors, and staff to take all necessary actions to ensure the accessibility of voting equipment and procedures including a VVPAT, wherever adopted, and

 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Council of the Blind does not support any legislation that would delay the deadline set forth in the Help America Vote Act.

 

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION OF

THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM

 

 

3. VOTING TECHNOLOGY

 

3.1.VOTING MACHINES

 

3.11.    Congress should pass a law requiring that all voting machines be equipped with a voter-verifiable paper audit trail and, consistent with HAVA, be fully accessible to voters with disabilities This is especially important for direct recording electronic (DRE) machines for four reasons (a) to increase citizens’ confidence that their vote will be counted accurately, (b) to allow for a recount, (c) to provide a backup in cases of loss of votes due to computer malfunction, and (d) to test — through a random selection of machines — whether the paper result is the same as the electronic result Federal funds should be appropriated to the EAC to transfer to the states to implement this law While paper trails and ballots currently provide the only means to meet the Commission’s recommended standards for transparency, new technologies may do so more effectively in the future. The Commission therefore urges research and development of new technologies to enhance transparency, security, and auditability of voting systems.

 

3.1.2.   States should adopt unambiguous procedures to reconcile any disparity between the electronic ballot tally and the paper ballot tally. The Commission strongly recommends that states determine well in advance of elections, which will be the ballot of record.

 

A DIEBOLD INSIDER SPEAKS!

BY BRAD FRIEDMAN

 

REPRINTED FROM: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-friedman/a-diebold-insider-speaks-_b_7539.html

 

September 19, 2005

 

DIEB-THROAT : 'Diebold System One of Greatest Threats Democracy Has Ever Known'

Identifies U.S. Homeland Security 'Cyber Alert' Prior to '04 Election Warning Votes Can be 'Modified Remotely' via 'Undocumented Backdoor' in Central Tabulator Software!

 

In exclusive stunning admissions to The BRAD BLOG some 11 months after the 2004 Presidential Election, a "Diebold Insider" is now finally speaking out for the first time about the alarming security flaws within Diebold, Inc's electronic voting systems, software and machinery. The source is acknowledging that the company's "upper management" -- as well as "top government officials" -- were keenly aware of the "undocumented backdoor" in Diebold's main "GEM Central Tabulator" software well prior to the 2004 election. A branch of the Federal Government even posted a security warning on the Internet.

Pointing to a little-noticed "Cyber Security Alert" issued by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), a division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the source inside Diebold -- who "for the time being" is requesting anonymity due to a continuing sensitive relationship with the company -- is charging that Diebold's technicians, including at least one of its lead programmers, knew about the security flaw and that the company instructed them to keep quiet about it.

"Diebold threatened violators with immediate dismissal," the insider, who we'll call DIEB-THROAT, explained recently to The BRAD BLOG via email. "In 2005, after one newly hired member of Diebold's technical staff pointed out the security flaw, he was criticized and isolated."

In phone interviews, DIEB-THROAT confirmed that the matters were well known within the company, but that a "culture of fear" had been developed to assure that employees, including technicians, vendors and programmers kept those issues to themselves.

The "Cyber Security Alert" from US-CERT was issued in late August of 2004 and is still available online via the US-CERT website. The alert warns that "A vulnerability exists due to an undocumented backdoor account, which could [sic: allow] a local or remote authenticated malicious user [sic: to] modify votes."

The alert, assessed to be of "MEDIUM" risk on the US-CERT security bulletin, goes on to add that there is "No workaround or patch available at time of publishing."

"Diebold's upper management was aware of access to the voter file defect before the 2004 election - but did nothing to correct it," the source explained.

A "MEDIUM" risk vulnerability cyber alert is described on the US-CERT site as: "one that will allow an intruder immediate access to a system with less than privileged access. Such vulnerability will allow the intruder the opportunity to continue the attempt to gain privileged access. An example of medium-risk vulnerability is a server configuration error that allows an intruder to capture the password file."

 

DIEB-THROAT claims that, though the Federal Government knew about this documented flaw, originally discovered and reported by BlackBoxVoting.org in August of 2004, they did nothing about it.

"I believe that top Government officials had an understanding with top Diebold officials to look the other way," the source explained, "because Diebold was their ace in the hole."

But even DIEB-THROAT -- who says "we were brainwashed" by the company to believe such concerns about security were nonsense -- was surprised to learn that an arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was well aware of this flaw, and concerned enough about it to issue a public alert prior to the election last year.

"I was aware of the Diebold security flaw and had heard about the Homeland Security Cyber Alert Threat Assessment website, so I went there and 'bingo,' there it was in black and white," the source wrote. "It blew me away because it showed that DHS, headed by a Cabinet level George Bush loyalist, was very aware of the 'threat' of someone changing votes in the Diebold Central Tabulator. The question is, why wasn't something done about it before the election?"

The CEO of North Canton, Ohio-based Diebold, Inc., Walden O'Dell has been oft-quoted for his 2003 Republican fund-raiser promise to help "Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year." O'Dell himself was a high-level contributor to the Bush/Cheney '04 campaign as well as many other Republican causes.

"A very serious problem...one malicious person can change the outcome of any Diebold election"

The voting company insider, who has also served as a spokesperson for the company in various capacities over recent years, admits that the "real danger" of this security vulnerability could have easily been exploited by a malicious user or an insider through remote access.

"I have seen these systems connected to phone lines dozens of times with users gaining remote access," said DIEB-THROAT. "What I think we have here is a very serious problem. Remote access using phone lines eliminates any need for a conspiracy of hundreds to alter the outcome of an election. Diebold has held onto this theory [publicly] for years, but Diebold has lied and has put national elections at risk. Remote access using this backdoor means that one malicious person can change the outcome of any Diebold election."  The ability to connect to the system remotely by phone lines and the apparent lack of interest by Diebold to correct the serious security issue in a timely manner -- or at all -- would seem to be at odds with at least one of their Press Releases touting their voting hardware and software.

In an October 31, 2003 Press Release as part of a publicity blitz to "sell" the new voting machines to the voters in the state of Maryland, Diebold Election Systems President Thomas W. Swidarski is quoted as follows in a section titled "Security Is Key":

Diebold has fine-tuned its computerized system so that it meets stringent security requirements. “We have independent verification that the Diebold voting system provides an unprecedented level of election security. This is crucial to maintaining the integrity of the entire voting process,” Swidarski added.

 

Attempts by The BRAD BLOG to get comment from Swidarski were passed to one of the Vice-Presidents at Diebold who has not returned our voice mail message.  We did, however, hear back from Diebold Spokesperson David Bear of the PR firm Public Strategies. He was referred to us by several different Diebold offices as "the man to discuss voting machine issues with."

Bear claimed to have never heard of the Cyber Alert issued by US-CERT and when told of it, refused to acknowledge it as anything more than "an unverified allegation."

"One of the greatest threats our democracy has ever known"

Our source expressed emphatically that future democratic elections in the United States are at stake and feels that the problem will not be corrected until Congressional action forces the company to do so.

"In my opinion Diebold's election system is one of the greatest threats our democracy has ever known, and the only way this will be exposed is with a Congressional investigation with subpoenas of not just Diebold officials but Diebold technicians."

If our experience in discussing the matter with Bear, the man Diebold referred us to for all matters concerning voting machines, is any indication, then DIEB-THROAT may be correct. Even a Cyber Alert Bulletin issued by an official arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security more than a year ago was not enough to phase Diebold. At least not enough to even inform their public spokesperson about the matter, apparently.

"I don't know anything about it," Bear claimed when we asked about the Cyber Alert, and he refused to acknowledge there were anysecurity concerns about Diebold's Voting Machines or its GEMS Central Tabulator software.

Over and over, by rote, he repeated in response to our questions: "The GEMS software has been used in hundreds of elections and there's never been a security issue."

Bear says that "Diebold machines have never lost a single vote," but beyond that could not speak to the vulnerability issue since, he said, "I don't know what vulnerability they're referencing."

We sent the link to the US-CERT Cyber Alert to Bear, but have not yet heard back from about it. He did, however, send us a copy of the well-worn Caltech/Massachusetts Institute of Technology report [PDF] analyzing the 2004 Presidential Election which, Bear pointed out in his Email, "concludes that the most improvement [in vote-counting and integrity over 2000] occurred when counties/states changed to touch screen systems."

DIEB-THROAT was taken aback, but not wholly surprised, when we shared the comments from Bear denying knowledge of the "backdoor" security vulnerability in the GEMS software and his contention that there was nothing more than "allegations."

The vulnerability, and the ability to "manipulate votes" occurs because the GEMS software uses the public Microsoft Access database software to store vote totals in a separate data file. And, as DIEB-THROAT explained, Access is "full of holes. There are so many ways to get into it."

Because GEMS uses the Access database, "you can enter and manipulate the file without even entering into GEMS," our source said in response ot Bear's denials.

"GEMS sits on top of this database and it pretty much feeds information down to the database from GEMS. It's almost like you're on the first floor of your house and all of your operating equipment is in the basement so that anything that happens on the first floor ends up downstairs. Well, downstairs has a wide open door to it. So we're dumping all the votes downstairs and that's wide open to the rest of the computer system."

"A culture of fear"

In trying to understand why the U.S. Homeland Security Department's Cyber Alert didn't force Diebold to make fixes, patches or corrections quickly available for their software prior to -- or even since -- the '04 election, DIEB-THROAT repeated over and over that Diebold was simply "not concerned about security".

"They don't have security solutions. They don't want them...They leave security policy issues up to the states. They've known about this for some time. They don't really care," the source said, comparing the security flaw to "leaving the front door at Fort Knox open." It's just "blatant sloppiness and they don't care."

The versions of the GEMS Central Tabulation software listed on the US-CERT site are 1.17.7 and 1.18 and DIEB-THROAT says the same versions of the same software are still in use by States around the country and haven't had any fixes or patches applied to correct the problem.

Diebold spokesman, Bear, was unable to confirm whether or not Diebold had updated its GEMS software in any way since the US-CERT Cyber Alert was released telling us only that "There's different versions of the software for different needs" and that he didn't know if patches, fixes or corrections were ever released by the company.  "There's always an evolution," Bear said. "Before any software can be used it's federally qualified and then certified by the states...Where different versions are running, I just don't know."

"They're still at that same version number," DIEB-THROAT said. "A lot of our customers still have it and there's not been any patch....They really don't care about this sort of thing. They really don't. People may find it hard to believe...in other words [the company says] 'we'll give you a machine to vote on and the rest is up to you."

"This is a very profit motivated company," the source continued, "they don't care what happens after the sale. Once they have the contract they've got the customer tied up pretty good."

Initially DIEB-THROAT claims to have been "brainwashed" by the pervasive "company line" at Diebold, that all of the talk about security concerns and the possibility that someone could hack the vote was the talk of "conspiracy theorists". Apparently that was -- and is still is -- "the company line." But after one of Diebold's head technicians who works out of their McKinney, Texas facility confirmed the gaping security hole in the software to our source, it was understood that these concerns were for real.

"Up until his confirmation, I had heard it through the grapevine, as rumors and such, but he confirmed it for me. The lead technician who worked on the software, who has a Phd in mathematics and so forth, was saying that 'this problem exists!'"  So why hasn't that technician, or anyone else from within the company spoken out until now?

"This is a culture of fear. Really. Only because we were good friends did [the head technician] confide in me that these were problems that needed to be fixed," DIEB-THROAT said.

"They all knew..."
In regards to possible remote access to the GEMS Central Tabulator by modem via phone lines, a way that hackers could easily and simply change the vote total information in the Access database, Diebold's official spokesman seemed to be similarly in denial even today.

When we asked Bear whether or not the Central Tabulator is still accessible via modem in their machines, he first denied that it's even possible, telling us "the Central Tabulator isn't accessable via modem."

When we pressed about whether or not there are still modem capabilities in the machines and software they sell, Bear admitted, "There is a modem capability, but it's up to a jurisdiction whether they wish to use it or not...I don't know of any jurisdiction that does that."

"Oh, boy. Such lies," DIEB-THROAT said in response. "There are several jurisdications that use [the modem capabilities] in the machines...Probably one of the most robust users of modems is Prince Georges County in Maryland. They've used it in every election. I believe they started in 2000. And Baltimore County used them in the November election in 2004. Fulton County and Dekalb County in Georgia may have used them in 2004 as well."

While we were unable to hear back in response to messages left with Election Officials at several of those offices prior to the publication of this article, a review of "Lessons Learned" after the November 2004 Election conducted by the Maryland state Board of Elections obtained by The BRAD BLOG, confirms that modems were used to access the GEMS Central Tabulator to send in information from precincts on Election Night.


We are still reviewing the complete document, but amongst the findings in the report is that "the GEMS system froze several times during heavy modem transmitting periods requiring the system to be rebooted, which generated delays and prohibited BOE from receiving polling places' transmissions."  As well, the report concludes, "Modem lines testing in polling place still problematic; need better coordination with school system."

 

It also says that "7% of voting units deployed failed on Election Day" and that an additional 5% "were suspect based on the number of votes captured." The BRAD BLOG hopes to have a follow-up article in the coming days which looks in more detail at the full Maryland state Board of Elections report and the alarming rate of failure for Diebold Touch-Screen voting machines.

When we asked our source if they had any evidence to show that the security flaw described by the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security was actually exploited in the 2004 election, DIEB-THROAT told us only: "I wouldn't say I have evidence that it was exploited....only that it was known. To the feds, to state officials and to Diebold. They all knew. In spite of the gap they moved forward as normal...As if it didn't exist."

 


 

 

Diebold and the Disabled 

 

By Kim Zetter

 

Reprinted from Wired News: http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,65292,00.html

 

Oct. 12, 2004

 

In the controversy over electronic voting machines, activists for disability groups have been at the forefront of campaigns to convince counties and states to purchase touch-screen voting systems. They've attested to the security and accuracy of the machines, going so far as to sue counties and states that don't purchase the machines. And they've opposed e-voting machines that produce a paper trail.

 

The disability groups say they're just fighting for the right to use accessible machines, because touch-screen voting systems are the only ones that let them cast ballots without assistance.

But other voting activists say disability groups have become shills for the voting companies, pressuring counties to buy insecure voting systems over other options.

 

"I feel they're using blind voters to pursue an agenda that's actually not in the interest of any voters," said Maryland voting activist Linda Schade of TrueVoteMD. "Because these machines don't discriminate when they lose votes, they can lose or inaccurately record the votes of blind voters as well as seeing voters."

 

Financial connections and a partnership between one disability group and Diebold Election Systems' parent company also raise questions about motives and conflicts of interest.

In November 2000, Diebold, a maker of automated teller machines, agreed to pay the National Federation of the Blind $1 million over five years to help build a new research and training institute. The money was offered in exchange for the NFB agreeing to drop a lawsuit it filed against Diebold for installing ATMs inaccessible to blind customers, when technology for making the machines accessible was available. The NFB also formed a partnership with Diebold to help the company develop and market accessible ATM machines -- an agreement that later extended to the company's touch-screen voting systems.

 

The NFB, which calls itself "the voice of the nation's blind," then used the Americans with Disabilities Act to file lawsuits against banks not using accessible ATMs. It later sued two states to force them to upgrade or obtain e-voting machines -- while a debate about the security and reliability of such systems was growing nationwide.

 

The NFB and its state affiliates have also advised states and the federal government on accessible voting issues and pushed for legislation regarding such systems without disclosing the group's relationship to Diebold. James Gashel, the NFB's lobbyist who testified on e-voting in congressional hearings in 2001, said most of the testimony and advising were done in 2000 and 2001, before Diebold entered the domestic voting business in 2002.

"I have not said boo to the Congress about voting since March 2001," he said. But even if he were to testify before Congress today, he said, he would not disclose the information unless asked because he doesn't think the issues are related.

 

"The resolution of a lawsuit involving ATMs (doesn't) have a thing to do with voting," Gashel said. "Voting and ATMs are two different kinds of technology." He also said the NFB's relationship with Diebold isn't a secret -- both entities in 2000 released announcements about the grant, which are posted on their websites.

 

But Alex Knott, political editor at the Center for Public Integrity, said even if the information is available publicly, the NFB should disclose it when speaking to states or federal agencies.

"It's important to note that his organization shares an affiliation with a company that has something to gain (from endorsements he makes)," Knott said. "If you're talking about a relevant topic and are receiving money from a company like that, it's important for you to be transparent."

Gary Ruskin of the Congressional Accountability Project agrees.

 

"This is basic information that bears on his point of view and the value of his testimony, and the public needs to know of any actual or potential conflicts of interest when he speaks to Congress or to states," Ruskin said.

 

By lobbying the government on legislation that would benefit Diebold while taking money from the company and helping to market Diebold products, Ruskin says the NFB risks the appearance that the NFB and its endorsement are "for sale."

 

"A million dollars is a lot of money for a nonprofit to receive," Ruskin said. "Anyone in Washington knows that money often comes with strings attached. He who pays the piper calls the tune. That's what Washington lobbying and gift giving is all about."

 

The NFB isn't the only disability group to receive money from voting companies. The government lobbyist for the American Association of People with Disabilities, who has traveled around the country testifying on behalf of touch-screen voting, acknowledged this year that his organization received at least $26,000 from voting companies, but only after first denying it.

When asked in April, Jim Dickson, vice president of government affairs for the AAPD, told Wired News his organization had never received money from voting companies. But in June, he told The New York Times the organization had gotten money.

 

Dickson didn't disclose the gifts at hearings in California this year, where he tried to convince officials not to decertify touch-screen voting machines made by Diebold and other companies. Nor did he disclose the information in Washington in May when he participated in hearings with the federal Election Assistance Commission.

 

"He comes to states where he's not even registered to vote and he gives this very heartfelt testimony about how meaningful it is to vote independently," said Natalie Wormeli, an attorney in California who is blind. "But in his testimony he never says he's a professional spokesperson, he never says he's not a registered voter in the state, and he never discloses how he's getting paid."

Dickson did not respond to repeated calls for comment.

 

The NFB's willingness to align itself with Diebold seems particularly strange in light of its own policy, expressed by lobbyist James Gashel before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Gashel told the committee that whenever the NFB tested technologies to evaluate their accessibility, it always purchased the equipment, rather than accept it gratis from vendors and risk the appearance of impropriety.

 

"The challenging word is 'buy' -- not 'accept' or 'receive,' but 'buy,'" Gashel said. "We find the money to support this effort because we want to be completely independent from manufacturers or marketing interests. This is essential if the advice we give or reports we publish are to be regarded as credible."

 

The issue of impropriety becomes especially sensitive where lawsuits are involved.

In March 2001, the president of the Vermont affiliate of the NFB initiated a lawsuit against Banknorth, Chittenden Bank, Northfield Savings Bank and the Vermont State Employees Credit Union for installing inaccessible ATMs. A year later Banknorth settled and agreed to install accessible ATMs at 470 locations in six states. Other banks settled as well.

 

But when Chittenden announced it would spend $250,000 over five years to modify or replace 35 of its 68 ATMs, the Vermont Free Press reported "the NFB said that was not enough, and continues to push for more talking ATMs, faster."

 

Activists said the goal of the bank lawsuits was to increase Diebold's revenue. A visually impaired woman in Virginia even filed a racketeering lawsuit against Diebold and the NFB, claiming the NFB was suing banks to force them to buy Diebold machines and increase the company's profits. She eventually dropped the case, however, and no evidence has ever surfaced to indicate the NFB pressured banks to buy Diebold machines. A spokesman for NCR, Diebold's main competitor in the ATM market, told Wired News that he had never heard banks complain that they were getting pressure to buy Diebold systems.

 

Diebold's revenue from the sale of financial self-service products worldwide fell 8.9 percent to $689.6 million in 2002 from $756.9 million in 2001, according to its annual report. Including services, Diebold's total revenue from its financial self-services business in 2002 was $1.397 billion, slipping from $1.405 billion the year before.

 

"We haven't seen anything in terms of lawsuits against our bank customers that had an appreciable impact on our business," said Diebold spokesman Michael Jacobsen. If banks upgraded their products to make them accessible (Diebold and other ATM makers have upgrading kits for this), it would cost only $1,000 to $2,000 per machine, as opposed to $40,000 for a new ATM.

 

ATM lawsuits aren't the only concerns that activists have about the connections between voting companies and disability groups. The NFB and AAPD have also turned their attention to voting lawsuits that promise to benefit vendors as much as voters with disabilities.

 

The NFB, AAPD and individuals with disabilities have filed half a dozen lawsuits in California, Washington, D.C., Florida and Philadelphia to force counties and states to purchase touch-screen voting machines. In Ohio, the NFB filed suit after Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell decided to delay the purchase of touch-screen machines over concerns that the systems were insecure.

 

In 2002, five visually impaired voters sued Maryland to force the state to buy accessible voting machines more quickly than it thought wise, and the NFB joined the suit six months later. Maryland now uses Diebold machines statewide, except in one county. This year, the NFB switched sides to defend the Maryland Board of Elections in a different suit filed by voting activists who challenged the legality and integrity of the Diebold systems.

 

Although in lawsuits the NFB has never specified which brand of touch-screen machines states and counties should purchase, the group has made no secret of its preference.

 

In 2002, when Maryland's Board of Elections asked researchers at the University of Maryland to conduct a usability study of the Diebold system, the researchers reported (PDF) that visually impaired voters found the system "confusing and hard to navigate." The board took issue with the report and defended the Diebold system saying it "is the system preferred by the National Federation of the Blind."

 

In September 2003, after computer scientists released reports showing that the Diebold touch-screen system was flawed, NFB President Marc Maurer said the NFB had "complete confidence in the proliferation and capacity of electronic voting systems and in Diebold Election Systems, in particular, to operate at an optimal level of security, accuracy and accessibility that protects the integrity of elections."

 

Doug Jones, a University of Iowa professor of computer science and a member of that state's board of examiners for voting systems, thought it was a strange comment to make for a group that knows nothing about computer programming.

 

"Why in the world would an organization like the NFB, that has no expertise in computer security or reliability, say something like that?" Jones said.

 

An NFB member wondered the same thing when he posted to an NFB e-mail list last September expressing concern about a conflict of interest "if NFB seems to only single out one company, and one that has contributed substantially to NFB coffers."

 

California attorney Wormeli is more concerned that by using the court system to force counties and states to purchase voting machines before they can be made more secure, they're putting the democracy at risk.

 

"It's the wrong approach at the wrong time," Wormeli said. "By letting them be sponsored by these corporations who only want to sell machines, they don't necessarily look out for our interest, which is to make sure our votes are getting counted properly."

As Wormeli told a hearing in a California earlier this year, "We have time to let the technology that's being perfected find its way to California. I refuse to be an impatient passenger in the back of the car saying, 'When are we going to get there?' I know we're going to get there, but I want to get there safely."

-         - -

 

The Disability Lobby and Voting

New York Times editorial
June 11, 2004

Two obvious requirements for a fair election are that voters should have complete confidence about their ballots' being counted accurately and that everyone, including the disabled, should have access to the polls. It is hard to imagine advocates for those two goals fighting, but lately that seems to be what's happening.

The issue is whether electronic voting machines should provide a "paper trail" -- receipts that could be checked by voters and used in recounts. There has been a rising demand around the country for this critical safeguard, but the move to provide paper trails is being fought by a handful of influential advocates for the disabled, who complain that requiring verifiable paper records will slow the adoption of accessible electronic voting machines.

The National Federation of the Blind, for instance, has been championing controversial voting machines that do not provide a paper trail. It has attested not only to the machines' accessibility, but also to their security and accuracy -- neither of which is within the federation's areas of expertise. What's even more troubling is that the group has accepted a $1 million gift for a new training institute from Diebold, the machines' manufacturer, which put the testimonial on its Web site. The federation stands by its "complete confidence" in Diebold even though several recent studies have raised serious doubts about the company, and California has banned more than 14,000 Diebold machines from being used this November because of doubts about their reliability.

Disability-rights groups have had an outsized influence on the debate despite their general lack of background on security issues. The League of Women Voters has been a leading opponent of voter-verifiable paper trails, in part because it has accepted the disability groups' arguments.

Last year, the American Association of People With Disabilities gave its Justice for All award to Senator Christopher Dodd, an author of the Help America Vote Act, a post-2000 election reform law. Mr. Dodd, who has actively opposed paper trails, then appointed Jim Dickson, an association official, to the Board of Advisors of the Election Assistance Commission, where he will be in a good position to oppose paper trails at the federal level. In California, a group of disabled voters recently sued to undo the secretary of state's order decertifying the electronic voting machines that his office had found to be unreliable.

Some supporters of voter-verifiable paper trails question whether disability-rights groups have gotten too close to voting machine manufacturers. Besides the donation by Diebold to the National Federation of the Blind, there have been other gifts. According to Mr. Dickson, the American Association of People with Disabilities has received $26,000 from voting machine companies this year.

The real issue, though, is that disability-rights groups have been clouding the voting machine debate by suggesting that the nation must choose between accessible voting and verifiable voting.

It is well within the realm of technology to produce machines that meet both needs. Meanwhile, it would be a grave mistake for election officials to rush to spend millions of dollars on paperless electronic voting machines that may quickly become obsolete.

Disabled people have historically faced great obstacles at the polls, and disability-rights groups are right to work zealously for accessible voting. But they should not overlook the fact that the disabled, like all Americans, also have an interest in ensuring that their elections are not stolen.

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND OF MARYLAND All rights reserved.